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Recent Developments

Mayor of Baltimore v. Schwing

O

verturning Waskiewicz v.
General Motors Corp.,
342 Md. 699, 679 A.2d 1094
(1996), the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a claim under
the
Maryland
Workers'
Compensation Act arising from a
previously existing condition was
not barred by the five-year
statutory period for reopening and
modifying the award when such a
claim was based on a new
exposure to a workplace hazard,
and not due solely to the natural
progression of a previously
existing disease.
Mayor of
Baltimore v. SchWing, 351 Md.
178, 717 A.2d 919 (1998).
Specifically, the court held that a
claim based partly on new
workplace exposures and partly on
natural progression may be filed
under
both
the
workers'
compensation occupational disease
statute and modification statute.
As a point of clarification, the
court held that when the
aggravation is due solely to a new
disability arising from a new
exposure, the claimant's remedy is
governed exclusively by the
occupational disease statute. An
aggravation of a disease based on
a natural progression is, however,
governed exclusively by the
modification statute. In reaching
this holding, the court of appeals
reversed its prior decision, and
reasserted the notion that the
Maryland's
Workers'
Compensation Act should be
construed in favor of the injured

WORKERS'
COMPENSATION
CLAIM FOR
AGGRAVATION OF
A PREEXISTING
DISEASE BASED
ON NEW
WORKPLACE
EXPOSURES MAY
BE ALLOWED
BEYOND THE
FIVE-YEAR
MODIFICATION
PERIOD
By John R. Muckelbauer

employee.
The statutes under Maryland's
Workers' Compensation Act ("the
Act") of particular concern here
are sections 9-711 and 9-736 ofthe
Labor and Employment Article of
the Annotated Code of Maryland.
Under section 9-711, if an
employee suffers a work related
disability, he or she must file a
claim
with
the
Workers'
Compensation
Commission
("Commission") within two years
of the disablement or when the
employee attains actual knowledge
that the event which caused the
disability was work related. Under
section 9-736, if an employee
seeks to reopen or modify a
previous award, the employee
must file within five years of the
last compensation payment.

In December 1982, Baltimore
City Firefighter Joseph Schwing
("Schwing") suffered a mild heart
attack. After a period of recovery,
Schwing resumed his duties as a
firefighter. In May 1983, Schwing
filed a claim for workers'
compensation benefits ("Claim
A") with the Commission.
However, as a result of a contract
between the city and his union,
Schwing was provided full pay and
benefits for the entire period of
missed work including coverage of
his medical bills. No further
proceedings occurred with respect
to this claim and no benefits were
paid through the actions of the
Commission. Although his heart
condition was monitored and
treated, Schwing was able to
resume his normal duties.
In 1993, Schwing suffered a
second heart attack. A subsequent
examination revealed serious heart
disease requiring quadruple bypass
surgery. Surgery was performed
and Schwing remained off work
from December 9, 1993 through
February 24, 1994. During this
recovery period, Schwing received
full salary and all medical
expenses were covered. In March
1994, Schwing filed a second
claim ("Claim B") seeking
compensation
for
the
cardiovascular condition, claimed
as an occupational disease. The
city argued that the second heart
attack was merely a worsening of
the condition which began in 1982,
and that the city was only
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responsible for continuing medical
care based on Claim A. Agreeing
with the state, the Commission
concluded that the 1993 heart
attack was the result of the same
cardiovascular
disease
that
disabled Schwing in 1982. In so
concluding, the Commission
determined that Claim B was
beyond the two-year statute of
limitations for such claims.
Schwing
appealed
the
Commission's decision to the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City.
He claimed that since he was able
to continue his employment
following the first heart attack, no
prior disablement existed. As
such, Schwing argued he was not
barred by the two-year statute of
limitations under section 9-711.
The circuit court held that there
was a disablement in 1982 and that
Claim B was barred because it was
not filed within two years of the
initial disablement. However, the
circuit court raised, sua sponte, the
issue of Claim A and held that
since it was timely filed in 1983,
and no award was ever paid, it was
not barred. As such, the circuit
court remanded the case to the
Commission to determine the
benefits under Claim A to which
Schwing may have been entitled.
Both parties appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland.
While the appeals were pending,
the circuit court, contrary to its
earlier
ruling,
filed
a
"Memorandum
Opinion
Addendum" and determined that
Claim B was timely filed.
The court of special appeals
determined that the circuit court
29.1 U. Bait. L.F. 62

did not have jurisdiction to
consider Claim A and limited its
decision to only Claim B. The
court did note, however, that
Schwing had suffered an earlier
temporary total disability resulting
from the heart attack in 1982 for
which no compensation payments
were made. The court analyzed
the
intent
of
Maryland's
occupational disease statute and
held that two or more separate
compensable disabilities may
result from the same occupational
disease. In so holding, the court
determined that Claim B was a
new disability that was not barred
by the five-year limitations period.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari to determine
whether a claim for the
aggravation
of an
earlier
occupational disease based upon
new InJUrIOUS exposures was
barred by the statute of limitations
under the Act.
While the court of special
appeals attempted to distinguish
the facts at bar from those
presented in earlier cases, the court
of appeals began its analysis by
squarely addressing and revisiting
its decision in Waskiewicz.
Schwing, 351 Md. at 194, 717
A.2d at 927. The court noted that
Waskiewicz barred an employee,
who had previously claimed and
received compensation, from
submitting a subsequent claim for
the same condition beyond the
statutory period, regardless of
whether the new claim was a result
of a new work-related exposure.
Id. at 196, 717 A.2d at 927-28.
The court explained that its

decision in Waskiewicz was simply
wrong and that the "true answer"
to this issue was found in the
Waskiewicz dissent. 1d. at 197,
717 A.2d at 928. The court, in
discussing the Waskiewicz dissent,
noted that its earlier decision was
not only unsupported by other
jurisdictions, it was contrary to the
laws of many other states. Id. By
citing an abundance of persuasive
authority, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland drew support for its
position that the holding under
Waskiewicz was overly harsh to
employees. Id. at 197-201, 717
A.2d at 928-30.
The court of appeals expanded the
argument by discussing the
ambiguity of the legislation. Id. at
203, 717 A.2d at 931. The court,
in support of the intermediate
appellate court's analysis, found no
reasonable basis to conclude that
the General Assembly intended to
bar an employee with an
occupational disability "from
recovering compensation for a
subsequent disability caused by a
subsequent exposure." Id. Such a
holding, the court determined,
would not only be contrary to the
law of most other jurisdictions, it
would be inimical to the
"Legislature's mandate" of viewing
workers' compensation claims
"liberally in favor of claimants."
Id. at 196, 717 A.2d at 928.
In analyzing this case, the
court compared the plain language
argument adopted in Waskiewicz
with the argument supporting
statutory construction. Id. at 20203, 717 A.2d at 931. In the end,
the court relied principally on
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public policy to support statutory
construction. Id at 203, 717 A.2d
at 931. The court explained that it
has been a long held policy in
Maryland for employees "disabled
by a compensable occupational
disease" or injury, to be "eligible
for
vocational
rehabilitation
services." Id at 203-04, 717 A.2d
at 931. The court determined that
it would be inconsistent with such
a practice to bar a worker's
compensation claim based on the
worsening of a previously claimed
condition when the subsequent
claim is not a result of the natural
progression of the condition. Id. at
206-07, 717 A.2d at 933. In so
determining, the court held that a
new claim under the Act arising
from a previously existing
condition is not barred by the fiveyear statutory time limitation for
reopening and modifying the
award, provided the claim is the
result of exposure to a new
workplace hazard and is not due
solely to the natural progression of
the previously existing condition.
Id at 205-06, 717 A.2d at 932-33.
Concurring with the majority's
judgment, Judge Raker, joined by
Judge Rodowsky, would affirm the
court of special appeals, yet leave
intact the holding of Waskiewicz.
Id at 208, 717 A.2d at 933-34.
Judge Raker explained that the
doctrine of stare decisis is such a
fundamental principle that prior
holdings should be disturbed only
as a last resort, and that the facts at
bar could be distinguished from
Waskiewicz. Id. at 209, 717 A.2d
at 934. As such, Judge Raker
suggested that the court of appeals

should refrain from judicial
activism and stated that if the
legislature wanted to change the
law, it would have done so. Id. at
215-16, 717 A.2d at 937-38.
In Mayor of Baltimore v.
Schwing, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland lifted from the claimant
the burden of filing an original or
modifying claim within certain
inequitable statutorily prescribed
periods when the claimant has
been exposed to additional
workplace hazards. This case
demonstrates
the
flexibility
inherent in the judicial process,
and provides a good example of
when such flexibility should
manifest. Although the courts
should refrain from judicial
activism, allowing unjust decisions
based on what may reasonably be
perceived as an oversight by the
legislature would be a dereliction
of duty. Considering the current
composition of the court of
appeals, such a holding will
predictably remain the law in
Maryland for many years to come.
Less predictable, however, will be
the response of the General
Assembly.
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